Feb. 9, 1966

            Humphrey to Visit Saigon to
        Study Reform Efforts Decided 
                Upon in Honolulu

                                      By TOM WICKER
                             Special to The New York Times

   HONOLULU, Feb. 8 — The United States and South Vietnamese Governments issued today a Declaration of Honolulu that appeared to place new emphasis on winning the war through a combination of military action and expanded civic reform programs.

   At the same time, President Johnson announced that he was sending Vice President Humphrey to Saigon. Officials said Mr. Humphrey's mission would be to see South Vietnamese reform programs in action so that he could pull together the Johnson Administration's efforts to increase their effectiveness.

   After a final meeting with Vietnamese leaders this morning, Mr. Johnson left at midday for Los Angeles for a talk in transit with Mr. Humphrey.

   Following the talk with the President, Mr. Humphrey will proceed to Honolulu.

                              'Just and Stable Peace'

   The Vice President will fly to Saigon tomorrow with Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnamese chief of state, and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the Premier.

   In the declaration the Vietnamese leaders joined with President Johnson in pledging "their determination in defense against aggression, their dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam and their commitment to the search for a just and stable peace."

   Specifically, Marshal Ky and General Thieu stated:

   "It is a military war, a war for the hearts of the people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution."

   In the same declaration, the United States Government pledged that its purpose in Vietnam was to prevent Communist aggression and that to that end it would give "full support" to political and social reforms and "special support" in helping stabilize the economy, increase food production, stamp out disease and enlarge education.

   There was scarcely a word in the declaration or in a communique that accompanied it to suggest an expanded war, intensified bombing of North Vietnam or other increased military activities.

   In the communique, the two Governments stated only "full agreement upon a policy of growing military effectiveness and of still closer cooperation between the military forces of Vietnam and those of the United States."

   Both Governments also noted "with regret the total absence of a present interest in peace on the part of the Government of North Vietnam," but agreed upon "continued diplomatic efforts for peace."

   In a section of the declaration setting forth "the purposes of the Government of the United States," it was stated that "the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every form."

   Despite the "harsh and negative response" received so far, the declaration said, both Governments remain determined that "no path to peace shall be unexplored" and that "the peace offensive of the United States Government and the Government of South Vietnam will continue until peace is secured."

                          Previous Pledges Exceeded

   The heavy emphasis in both documents on the need for social, economic and political reform in South Vietnam as an integral part of winning the war apparently was the primary achievement of the Honolulu conference.

   No previous South Vietnamese Government had gone so far in pledging specific programs to create a better life for the people and none had so frankly acknowledged that this would be necessary before the loyalties of the people could be won away from the Vietcong.

   In a section of the declaration laying down "the purposes of the Government of Vietnam," General Thieu and Marshal Ky made the following pledges:

   "We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil" as a part of the prevention of Communist domination of Southeast Asia.

   "We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people."

   "We must establish and maintain a stable, viable economy and build a better material life for our people."

   "We must build true democracy for our land and our people," by formulating a democratic constitution, seeking its approval by secret ballot in a referendum of the people and electing a government.

                           Action by 1967 Hoped For

   Marshal Ky said at a news conference that he hoped the political evolution of a constitutional government could be completed next year.

   Several specific reforms were set forth in the communique as immediate targets. They included rural construction "efforts of particular strength and intensity in areas of high priority"; directing these efforts "to meet the people's need for larger output, more efficient production, improved credit, handicrafts and light industry, and rural electrification"; moving new and more productive strains of rice, corn and vegetable seeds from the laboratory to the farmers' fields; speeding land reform and increasing efforts to train health personnel and improve medical logistics.

   The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, John W. Gardner, will make a later trip to Saigon to inspect the health effort and other programs to build schools, train teachers and provide textbooks.

   A special effort will also be made, the communique said, to care for refugees and to provide schools for refugee children.

   The communique pledged "further concrete steps" to combat inflation.

   To further the rural construction program, both Governments said, particular emphasis will be put on building democracy in rural areas — "an effort as important as the military battle itself" — and on concentrating resources in regions that could be protected against Vietcong attack.

                                 Steps Long Urged

   All these steps have long been urged by those who have contended that the only way to defeat Communist insurgency was to attack the social, economic and political defects that caused it even while the military struggle was continuing.

   High United States officials here conceded, for instance, that not even an aerial assault on North Vietnam at four times the intensity of that now being carried out could win the war in the South.

   Government officials said the purpose of Vice President Humphrey's trip to South Vietnam, which they estimated might last two or three days, would be to "continue the momentum" toward the social and economic reforms discussed here. They said President Johnson wanted a top-level official who might later be put in charge of marshaling American assistance for the reform programs.

   The details of the rest of Mr. Humphrey's tour were not made public in Honolulu because the Administration was waiting for diplomatic clearance from the six other countries in "Southeast Asia and the subcontinent" that Bill D. Moyers, the White House press secretary, said were involved.

   Mr. Humphrey will be accompanied to Saigon by the Secretary of Agriculture, Orville L. Freeman; Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman; McGeorge Bundy, the President's special assistant for national security affairs; Leonard Marks Jr., director of the United States Information Agency; Jack Valenti, a special assistant to the President, and Lloyd N. Hand, the State Department's chief of protocol.

   All but Mr. Freeman and Mr. Bundy will accompany the Vice President on the rest of his tour.

   Before leaving Washington today, Mr. Humphrey said he was going to Saigon to help in "extending all our energies to promote and carry forward" the reform programs Mr. Johnson and the Vietnamese officials had discussed here.

   It was believed here that the Vice President's presence in South Vietnam might raise large security problems. It was not known whether he planned to leave Saigon for visits into the countryside, though this would seem likely if he was to have a first hand look at the problems the reform programs are designed to attack.

   All these developments, while they signaled no slackening of the war, seemed to indicate that both Governments were not hopeful of an early negotiated peace or of a military victory. Instead, they seemed to be concentrating on using both military and civic action to end the influence of the Vietcong in South Vietnam where they are now estimated to control three-fourths of the territory [see follow-up story, Times02/11/66 and Document 02/09/66].